The pattern of development along this transitional path may, of course, differ, as for example in the relative contribution of bank-or market-based financial systems. But all countries, Goldsmith observed, trace a similar transitional path in the increase in their superstructure of financial instruments and institutions relative to an infrastructure of output and wealth. Because of the close relationship between financial transition and modern economic growth as defined by Simon Kuznets, differences in speed at which countries traverse Goldsmith's transitional path are critical.
In 1870, 'a percipient and knowledgeable economist' like Mill or Marx, Goldsmith argued, would have expected India to progress further along the path of financial transition than Japan. 'Neither Mill nor Marx would ever have envisaged the abysmal difference' in transitional speeds, and therefore financial development, that over subsequent decades increasingly differentiated the two countries. 2 For many of the reasons that Goldsmith cited as relevant to the India-Japan comparison, it might also have been anticipated in 1870 that Southeast Asian countries would move as quickly as Japan towards financial transition.
Japan and the six Southeast Asian countries of Burma, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia, Indochina and the Philippines were all poor, overwhelmingly agrarian economies with similar per capita incomes and sectoral distributions of output and labour force. Indeed, in some respects Southeast Asian countries might have been thought in 1870 the more likely to accomplish financial transition and an associated process of economic development. The 1868
Meiji Restoration only just completed, Japan was still politically unstable, whereas Southeast Asia already had, or was about to acquire, the stability and strong legal framework associated fundamental in explaining the economics of transition. In Southeast Asian countries, relatively undeveloped political and social structures and a lack of national identity restricted resistance to nineteenth-century Western expansionism. A resulting extension of colonialism severely limited the possibility of financial transition. Japan, however, was sufficiently socially and politically unified to respond to foreign intrusion with a strong nationalism and drive towards military power, industrialisation and modern finance.
The history of financial transition in Japan is sometimes written in terms of a great-man theory, the great man being Count Masayoshi Matsukata. In Southeast Asia, colonial rule effectively precluded the emergence of 'great men' to effect financial transition. Even supposing, however, that six such individuals had existed, one for each Southeast Asian country, the article suggests that they would have remained in obscurity: the environment of an emergence of a modern state and modern economic growth which complement financial transition and allow great men to act was lacking. 
I. Growth and Change in Southeast Asia and Japan
Between 1870 and the Second World War, economic growth in both Southeast Asia and Japan was substantial but took quite different courses. As striking were the opposite effects on Japan and Southeast Asia of foreign intervention. This section analyzes contrasting Southeast Asian and Japanese development patterns.
In 1850, little of Southeast Asia, except Java, some other parts of Indonesia, and the Philippines, then still ruled by Spain, was under European control. Societies in Southeast Asia were, however, too traditional, too technologically backward and too fragmented to repel or negotiate effectively with foreigners. By the 1880s, when Japan had fulfilled the 'politically essential preconditions' for transition to a modern state, 9 most of Southeast Asia was divided into spheres of Western influence or had fallen under colonial rule. At the turn of the century, Southeast Asia was governed by four colonial powers -Britain (Burma and Malaya); the Netherlands (Indonesia); France (Indochina); and the United States (the Philippines). Thailand (Siam), nominally independent, had quasi-colonial arrangements and a British financial advisor.
After 1870, growth in Southeast Asia stemmed predominantly from international trade that afforded a 'vent' or outlet to utilize surplus land in the production of primary commodities which, unless exported, would not have been worth the effort of producing. However, in parts of Southeast Asia, including Java, north Vietnam in Indochina, and central Luzon in the Philippines, dense population ruled out vent-for-surplus growth. Prominent in the venting of surpluses was dependence on a few staple exports. Burma, Thailand and Indochina all relied heavily on rice, the Philippines on sugar, and both Malaya and Indonesia (in its so-called Outer
Provinces beyond the Javanese centre) on tin and rubber.
Vent-for-surplus agricultural output in Southeast Asia divided between small farmers and estates, predominantly European-owned. Before about 1910 estates had significance only in parts of Indonesia and the Philippines, while small Chinese enterprises produced most of Malaya's tin. Subsequently, large-scale units gained in prominence. But even in the inter-war years small farmers produced the bulk of Southeast Asian exports.
In Japan, the arrival of Commodore Perry's squadron in Edo (Tokyo) Bay in 1853 and again in 1854 closely paralleled the timing of Western expansionism in Southeast Asia. Japan
was forced to open itself to trade, grant treaty port concessions, and accept 'semi-colonial' status until the 1880s. 10 But, despite the several similarities, Japan had initial conditions superior to Southeast Asia's. By the mid-nineteenth century, population had for some time remained stable.
Although some 80% of Japan's labour force engaged in farming, Edo, Kyoto and Osaka were large cities. Crafts and trade were significant activities and, more important, spread fairly evenly through Japan. There was already a well developed, if traditional, financial system.
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Japan's remarkable homogeneity of culture and language, when harnessed by the Meiji Restoration, powerfully promoted a 'burst of enthusiasm for national goals'. 12 'Ideas of modernity -progress, science, and rationality -meant a great deal to the Japanese people', most of whom looked to the state to initiate change. 13 The conservative oligarchy that gained legitimacy in Meiji Japan viewed international relations as a 'single alternative: conquer or be conquered'. 14 To avoid the latter required economic 'catch up' and the creation of a modern state like those which emerged in nineteenth-century Western Europe and the United States. 15 Fundamental to these political and economic objectives was the development of modern financial institutions.
An identification of industrialisation and financial development with nationalism and the military power necessary to respond to Western intrusion directed growth in Japan along a path different to Southeast Asia's. So too did Japan's factor endowment of labour, not resource, abundance. In 1881 population density in Japan was 271 persons per square mile compared to 25 to 53 persons in Southeast Asian countries excepting Java. To grow economically, Japan had to rely on technical change and structural transformation. At first, the dominant force in Japanese growth was indigenous or so-called Meiji technology. Between 1870 and 1900 its spread decisively raised agricultural productivity. 16 Silk filature and Japan's first modern industry, cotton goods manufacture, expanded rapidly. Even so, in 1905 manufacturing and mining together comprised only 12% of Japan's GDP, compared to agriculture's 26%. 17 In the 1920s the focus of Japanese technological development moved towards heavier, capital intensive industry such as chemicals, iron and steel, machinery and electrical equipment. 18 'Post-textile' technology was accompanied by profound structural change that shifted resources into faster growing sectors than agriculture and continuously afforded opportunities to adopt and finance new technology. By 1939 manufacturing and mining accounted for 34% of GDP and agriculture for just 15%.
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War and Imperialism had major developmental implications for both Southeast Asia and Japan. For Japan, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5
were, in cost-benefit terms, among modern history's 'most effective political and economical military operations' 20 and important both to financial development and industrialisation. War indemnity from China enabled Japan to join the international gold standard in 1897 and so borrow in London to finance the Russo-Japanese conflict. The consequent benefits of enhanced international standing and 'the possibility of exploiting China' exceeded even those of the 1894-95 war. 21 Southeast Asian countries were, by contrast, the vanquished not the victors of late nineteenth-century imperial aggression.
By 1886, Japan had begun modern economic growth. 22 To be sure, from the 1870s onwards Southeast Asian countries -like Japan -acquired extensive infrastructure such as roads, harbours, electric power, telegraphs and telephones. In Southeast Asia technical progress also occurred in tin mining, petroleum extraction, the processing of primary commodity exports and merchant activities. But vent-for-surplus agricultural staples in inter-war Southeast Asia were grown employing much the same technologies as had been used decades previously. by March 1870 the government had already issued 20 proclamations to try to resolve a currency system described as 'chaotic'. 25 The Mexican dollar, as in Southeast Asia, served in early Meiji Japan as the currency for international payments. 26 During the late nineteenth century Southeast Asia's monetary systems became increasingly uncertain and piecemeal due to a progressive breakdown in the silver standard, and so also in the use of the Mexican dollar for domestic as well as international payments.
Southeast Asian governments were forced into regulation. A near-universal solution was the adoption of the gold-exchange standard, by Indonesia in 1891, and within seventeen years by all but one of the other countries: Indochina remained on silver until 1930 and had more flexible monetary arrangements than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. 27 The gold-exchange standard incorporated colonial currencies into the international gold standard by tying them, rather than directly to gold, to the gold-based currencies of the ruling country (for Siam, Britain) at a fixed exchange rate. Because the link to gold was through the metropolitan currency, the system could be described variously as the sterling-, dollar-or guilder-exchange standard. 28 Southeast Asian gold-exchange standard currencies were comprehensively backed by foreign reserves, typically in the currency of the ruling country. The backing was usually 110% 29 In
Indonesia the government gave a private bank, the Java Bank, the exclusive right to issue currency, subject to a high reserve backing. The Bank safeguarded exchange rate fixity with the Dutch guilder through discount policy but, like currency boards, could not control Indonesia's domestic monetary policy. 30 The new Southeast Asian colonial currencies -under a currency board, or currency-board-like, system identical to metropolitan currency apart from the printing on the notes -quickly gained credibility. Unified systems of money spread rapidly throughout the region. 31 After the Meiji Restoration a swift modernization of Japan's monetary system might seem a near precondition for speedy financial transition. Instead, the establishment of the yen as a national currency convertible into specie was lengthy process and depended on extensive government involvement to build a modern banking system and stabilise the yen. Two government attempts soon after the Restoration to encourage the development of a banking system failed. A major stumbling block was public distrust of paper money combined with the convertibility of bank notes into silver, which made it difficult to keep the paper in circulation. 32 In its third attempt, the government imaginatively created a banking system while at the same time finding an alternative to the great burden on the exchequer of pensions which had been paid to feudal lords (daimyo, numbering less than 300) and their sumurai, or warrior, retainers. The pensions had been given after an 1873 Meiji land tax replaced feudal in-kind levies on the rice harvest. By 1876 the pensions had been commuted to government bonds. The National Bank
Act of 1876 allowed the commutation bonds to be used to capitalise banks; bank notes ceased to be convertible into specie, and greater profit margins for banks increased the incentive to enter banking. Just four national banks existed in 1876, but by 1879 these numbered 151 and extended to most parts of Japan. Samurai and the nobility, mostly ex-daimyo, held 75% of the stock of national banks. 33 Most deposits in the new banks were the government's. Even at the end of the 1870s, however, Japan's monetary system remained unstable, fragmented, and subject to serious inflation.
Count Matsukata, appointed finance minister in 1881 and the architect of the financial system as it developed over the next three decades, immediately adopted strict monetarist orthodoxy and began a far-reaching programme of institution building. He used the Belgian central bank and pre-1914 German Reichsbank as models to found the Bank of Japan in 1882.
Between 1881 and 1885 Matsukata engineered savage money supply contraction and deflation, and used a sweeping privatisation of state-owned enterprises to reduce government liabilities.
By 1886 Japan had stable public and private finance. A network of commercial banks existed and the Bank of Japan began effectively to assume the functions of a central bank. Its notes, convertible into specie, started to replace inconvertible paper money and by 1897 comprised three quarters of money supply.
The Bank of Japan resembled the Reichsbank in its elastic issue system, which allowed notes to be issued well in excess of gold reserves. By contrast, colonial monetary arrangements amounted to an extreme version of the classical gold standard. A loss in foreign reserves, for example arising from a slump in foreign demand and fall in the value of exports relative to imports, necessitated an immediate and automatic contraction in local money supply. Monetary contraction reinforced the initial contraction from a decline in exports and, in the event of a sharp initial downturn, led to a bank liquidity crisis. 34 Unlike a central bank, currency boards, such as those in Southeast Asia and the Java Bank, minimise government involvement and cannot act as a lender of last resort to commercial banks or attempt to stabilize the economy.
III. Banking development
In developing countries the financial system can be described as dual if most of the economy relies on informal or pre-modern finance, and if this finance is largely separate from a relatively small modern financial sector. A test for financial transition is the extent to which elements of dualism are continuously eliminated as countries develop a unified modern financial system that expands at the expense of informal finance. One theme of this section is the financial dualism characteristic of Southeast Asia compared to Japan's progressive unification in the market for finance. A second, related theme is how government can accelerate -or frustrate -financial transition. The two themes of market segmentation and the role of government are discussed in this and in subsequent sections on long-term and rural finance.
Japanese banking in the 1860s paralleled Southeast Asia's in that a number of major European (chiefly British) banks opened branches to finance foreign trade. Thereafter, however, while in Southeast Asia formal finance continued to be dominated by a handful of European branch banks, finance rapidly evolved in Japan. The main change in Southeast Asia was the emergence after 1900 of a distinct tier of local Asian banks that competed little, if at all, with
European banks, thus preserving a clearly segmented financial structure.
In the nationalist and modernizing climate of Meiji Japan, reliance for finance on an 1860s 'western banking invasion' (also prominent in Southeast Asia) and local quasi-banks, engaged in moneylending and a variety of financial activities, was never acceptable. 35 Instead, Japan's government-led development of finance centered on creating a modern banking system.
Subsidies to develop bank finance as an infant industry came in three ways: through the right of national banks to issue notes at zero cost; through government deposits in national and private banks; and through the government's use of these banks to carry out a number of its fiscal activities. After a mid-1890s withdrawal of the note-issuing privileges of national banks, the Bank of Japan was the sole issuer of bank notes. 36 Between 1900 and 1913 Japanese banks (now a single system of so-called ordinary banks after the expiration of national bank charters) evolved into true financial intermediaries:
half of their funds came from deposits whereas in 1870 banks had mainly lent their own funds. In Japan a development-oriented nationalism and an effective government bureaucracy which promoted modern finance infused financial development with a dynamism largely absent in Southeast Asia. Japan's route to currency unification based on the yen might seem unnecessarily protracted compared to Southeast Asia's swift and successful introduction of unified currencies. But Japan's approach had the strong advantages -consistent with the 'finance-led' growth Rousseau and Sylla find for the United States and Rousseau for Japan 39 -of rapidly building an integrated financial network which promoted the economy's structural transformation from agriculture towards industry, and especially during the inter-war years to heavy and chemical industries. 40 Monetary flexibility of a kind impossible under colonial currency boards enabled the Japanese government to oversee the banking system, to mitigate banking instability in the 1920s, and, through Japan's banks, to direct resources towards economic modernization. 41 At the turn of the century in Southeast Asia, formal finance (as in Japan just before the Statistics for bank assets tell much the same story as monetary data (table 3) . By 1938
Southeast Asia was well behind Japan, both in terms of bank assets relative to GNP and per capita assets. Malaya was again apparently the most financially advanced Southeast Asian country but because no statistics for it exist until 1949 comparison is approximate. A higher assets/GNP ratio in Japan than the United States reflects the large role of the banking system in Japanese financial development.
IV. Long-term finance
The banks established in Japan after 1870 were ill suited to the provision of long-term finance, but by, in effect, providing this were important to industrialisation. It has been said that banks
were 'decisive' in the development of the railway, cotton spinning, and silk reeling industries.
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But long-term finance in late nineteenth-century Japan also depended on the availability of stock markets and, crucially, on government support for the banks. This section considers four issues.
It first discusses stock market development in Japan and Southeast Asia. Second, an analysis of railway finance shows the complementary relationship between the private sector and Meiji government. Third, the Japanese government's establishment of institutions for long-term finance is considered. Fourth, the section analyzes long-term finance in Southeast Asia.
In 1878 stock exchanges, modeled on European markets, began in Tokyo and Osaka.
The Tokyo Exchange, established to afford ex-samurai bondholders an outlet for their money, soon grew into the premier of a multiplicity (46 by 1898) of new exchanges set up, with government encouragement, throughout Japan. In 1890 only 1% of Japan's 4,300 joint stock companies were listed on the Tokyo Exchange. But they were all 'first rate big companies playing major roles in the new industrialisation' and included representatives of the three main industries of railways, cotton spinning and electric power. 51 Nineteenth century railway building in developing areas was typically financed through foreign investment, mainly from Britain. Japan was at first no different: in 1870 the Meiji government borrowed in London for a railway linking Tokyo and the port of Yokohama. 54 But soon Meiji policy eschewed foreign borrowing. 55 Instead, government turned to private national finance and supported it strongly with state resources. Private railway companies accounted for over two-thirds of the rail network of 7,725 kilometers by 1905, and 80% of their capital had been raised through stock issues. Much of this capital came through effectively long-term finance from banks, both because of bank lending to finance the purchase of railway shares against these as collateral, and because of banks' substantial railway shareholdings. Starting in 1885 the Bank of Japan, contrary to its stated rules as a central bank, underwrote long-term bank finance for railways through advancing to banks against the collateral of railway shares.
Finance for railway development was mobilized through a system of interconnected incentives. The banks could attract funds by offering private depositors a comparatively safe fixed return, while railway shareowners, borrowing from banks to finance stock purchases, anticipated dividends above bank interest rates. A dominance of 'dividend-seeking investors' insistent on the distribution of almost all railway company profits reflected their need to finance bank loans. 56 The Tokyo and Osaka stock exchanges afforded investors both liquidity and an institution through which, if railway stock appreciated, shares could be sold and a capital gain realized.
The relationship forged around railway development in Japan was not just between railways and banks nor between railways and stock markets alone. Rather there was a synergy between individual shareholders, the banks as lenders and as railway shareholders, stock markets and the government. Use by banks of short-term private deposits to finance long-term railway stock loans was risky. Risk mounted as railway stock became a sizeable proportion of bank assets. 57 The Bank of Japan responded to an 1890 collapse in the value of railway stock by adding to the list of railway company shares it accepted as collateral and by enlarging for railway shares its 'last resort' or special discount system. Until nationalization of the rail network in 1906, the Bank of Japan remained the ultimate bearer of railway stock collateral loans. 58 This role of government acting through the Bank of Japan -a relationship underplayed by Miwa and Ramseyer in their emphasis on the importance of stock marketswas crucial, not just to railways but also to other industries. 59 Through special discounting to banks, the Bank of Japan 'could extend its support to securities markets, which would then inevitably come to rely heavily upon the Bank in the new century'. 60 Railway nationalization in 1906-7, effected by issuing public bonds in exchange for railway shares, freed and re-directed the large amount of private capital tied up in railways into other long-term investment. Compensation for nationalization was paid at about twice railway construction costs. 61 The Meiji state used railway nationalization to substitute for private financial intermediation. Funds that the government mobilized from a wider domestic and international public were put, as part of nationalization, in the hands of entrepreneurs likely to undertake productive, long-term investment. Former railway shareholders who sold the nationalization bonds would not, the Finance Minister explained, use the money for 'eating and drinking sake. I am sure they are bound to set up spinning and shipping companies in Japan or invest willingly in such enterprises in Manchuria and Korea'. 62 And, in fact, one-time Japanese railway capitalists, drawing on the highly liquid public bonds as capital and collateral, invested heavily in the iron and steel industry, light railways, tramways, and gas and electric power companies. Among others, Mitsubishi 'profited enormously' from railway nationalization and used this capital injection to invest in shipbuilding and mining and branch into several new industries. 63 One source of state funds for railway nationalization was a postal savings system set up by the government in 1875. Like post office banks in United Kingdom-ruled Southeast Asian colonies, postal saving arrangements in Japan derived from Gladstone's British model. But
Meiji Japan, under Matsukata's urging, mandated that the postal savings 'concentrate funds from the hands of the people for modernization'. 64 Postal savings, in 1919 equivalent to 13% of total banking deposits, became for the government 'a huge, opaque pool for various policy lending purposes'. 65 The late nineteenth-century interrelationship between the Japanese state and a financial system which (the stock market apart) was not suited to long-term investment was an ingenious makeshift. Meiji Japan recognized, however, the need for institutions specifically designed to Three reasons for differential rural financial development in Japan and Southeast Asia can be identified. One was that intersectoral financial linkages grew in Japan but only to a limited extent in Southeast Asia. In late nineteenth-century Japan, supply leading policies which made banking profitable led to an increase in the number of banks and branches such that by 1901 banking reached 'virtually every town'. 72 Agriculture could draw extensively on bank finance, especially for the commercial crops of silk, tea and rice. 73 Furthermore, the Nippon Kagyo Bank, along with its prefecture affiliates, actively financed agricultural improvements.
Until 1900, agriculture was a net borrower from the banking system and the former rural elite net lenders to the banks. 74 After the turn of the century, closely integrated Japanese rural and urban finance promoted structural change and economic growth through the transfer of agricultural surpluses to the industrial sector.
No rural banking network comparable to Japan's developed in Southeast Asia. European and local Asian banks remained concentrated in the main port cities. Local Asian banks, unlike the region's cultivators, were mainly ethnic Chinese and, furthermore, too newly established seriously to consider extending operations to rural areas. Dawson's Bank in Burma, with its head office in Pyapon and eight branches by 1929, was the principal instance of a Europeanowned bank in rural Southeast Asia. 75 Second, there was a clear divergence between Japanese and Southeast Asia governments in their approach to rural finance. Until around 1900 the Japanese government's attitude towards financial provision in rural areas was laissez-faire. 76 In 1900, however, the Industrial
Cooperatives Law led to the reorganization of existing cooperatives and the formation of many new ones to provide credit. Amendments to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank Law allowed up to five-year loans from the Agricultural and Industrial Banks to credit cooperatives.
Furthermore, they could draw liberally on funds from the government's Deposit Bureau, which itself mainly tapped the postal saving system. Credit cooperatives grew rapidly until 1917, by which time deposits first began to exceed lendings.
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As in pre-1900 Japan, governments in Southeast Asia were little, if at all, involved in rural financial provision. 78 That changed in the twentieth century as part of a growing interest in Asian welfare. But Southeast Asian governments, not driven by the strong political agenda of nationalist and modernization goals of the Japanese state, generally promoted cooperatives with far less enthusiasm, and certainly with fewer resources, than in Japan.
Third, differences in geographical and social settings help to explain contrasting Japanese and Southeast Asian rural finance. Government involvement, as in Japan, can help to establish rural cooperatives, but these ultimately depend on social organization, commitment and cultural attitudes. Plural societies and the frontier character of Southeast Asia's vent-for-surplus areas militated against cooperation. In Thailand's rice export areas, for example, many families made several moves in a lifetime; peasants 'who felt overwhelmed by debt dues and tax arrears disappeared in the middle of the night and sought out new land'. 79 An exception was Java, where more settled communities and economies of scale associated with high population density created, as in Japan, characteristics consistent with an ethos of cooperation and with institutional finance achieving cost effectiveness. The Dutch built on these advantages with substantial efforts to establish credit facilities through networks of regulated pawnshops and village banks. 80 But in 1939 in Southeast Asia as a whole, including Indonesia's Outer Provinces, Asian cultivators continued to rely almost entirely on informal finance from such sources as village storekeepers, moneylenders and rotating saving and credit associations.
VI. Findings and Discussion
Financial transition in capitalist economies tends to divide into two phases. In an initial period, Financial development in Japan, by contrast, bears out Gerschenkron's predictions for latecomers: that some form of modern financial system is acquired at an accelerated pace; that government often takes the initiative in instigating this; and that the country borrows foreign techniques, as Japan so liberally did when setting up its financial institutions. 86 Second, in Japan, much more than in Southeast Asia, continuous technological innovation and movement towards large-scale production created important new outlets for finance and investment. Principal objects for finance in pre-Meiji Japan were 'the deficits of aristocratic and rural overspenders, not exactly the right basis for a financial system linked to sustained economic growth'. 87 Japan between 1868 and 1939 easily fits such a model. Japanese financial development cannot be understood other than as part of a politically inspired drive to modernisation and industrialisation.
Men do not make history independent of existing forces, and I have argued that in latenineteenth century Southeast Asia the absence of an effective political nationalism made financial transition highly unlikely. Even given a more advanced financial structure, it seems doubtful that Southeast Asia could have progressed too much further towards modern economic growth than it did: in Southeast Asia the restrictive features of colonialism worked against both economic development and financial transition. Financial development requires a permissive social and economic base, and is much helped, as Sylla observes, if not by war at least by some similar peacetime stimulus. 90 There was, in pre-World War II Southeast Asia, no possibility of strongly government-led financial development like that in Singapore beginning in the 1970s. 
